Jun 6, 2008, News Report
Arizona Secretary of State Jan Brewer yesterday sent a letter to Pima County addressing her concerns about the county's recent election procedure report which was released this past April. She noted that over the past six years, her administration has established a rigorous end-to-end election process with procedures that are among the tightest and most secure in the nation.
"Although some of your recommendations make sense, most are problematic, unnecessary, and/or unjustifiable, and nearly all establish a protocol for Pima County that is vastly different and unworkable for every other county," said Brewer, "It is simply bad policy for one county to push its agenda -- which appears to be largely driven by local politics and not on reasoned analysis -- on every other county."
In her 11-page response letter to Pima County, Brewer also listed several major security vulnerabilities, including Pima's unilateral decision to discontinue the modem transmission of election results from polling places on election night. Brewer noted this specific practice provides no independent method for memorializing the results from a given precinct.
"Not only will discontinuing the modem transmission of results substantially delay the reporting of unofficial results on election night, it actually introduces a major security vulnerability into the election process," stated Brewer, "Your supposed ‘security procedure' apparently does not even consider that something could happen to the machines and ballots in route to the election headquarters, in which case the results at that precinct would be lost forever. Certainly the odds of some event happening during the transportation of the ballots are low, but they are no doubt far greater than the remote possibility of some hacker intercepting the results, which again would be quickly caught during the post-election audit."
Brewer also took issue with Pima County 's proposal to discontinue the use of its accessible voting devices for disabled voters noting that this proposal "violate[s] federal and state law and would unnecessarily disenfranchise Pima County voters with disabilities." Brewer further admonished Pima County for failing to use the federal funds available to the county to assist voters with disabilities and specifically noted a recent complaint from a disability group regarding Pima County 's failure to accommodate voters with disabilities. "I am disappointed that Pima County has not requested the maximum amount available to it and that $63,688.89 of the money that it has received has not been spent," Brewer said.
Finally, Brewer was critical of Pima County officials for releasing all past election databases to the Pima County Democratic Party after they spent money and time fighting in court for over a year against the release.
"I am at a loss as to why Pima County would argue in court against the release of election databases and then turn around and immediately release more databases than ordered by the court," said Brewer. "It is no surprise that the court reversed itself in the post-judgment proceedings and ordered the release of this information given the actions by the Board."
"The bulk of your recommendations seem to minimize the significance of our existing security protocol and imply that serious problems exist when nothing could be further from the truth," said Brewer.
"I must reemphasize the point I made in my earlier letter to you about the importance of following the existing physical security protocol for election equipment in your county to prevent any unauthorized person from having access to electronic voting equipment and ballots. The procedures in Arizona go above and beyond what is necessary to secure an election and it is for this reason that we have never had an election security breach in our state."
It would be wise for everyone reading this report to refer to the findings in the CA Secretary of State's Top-To-Bottom- Review (TTBR) http://www.sos.ca.gov/elections/elections_vsr.htm released in August 2007 which decertified All Electronic Voting Systems used by CA counties due to the severe and critical security vulnerabilities which were discovered by our nation's top computer scientists to be present in all CA's e-voting systems. Secretary of State Bowen's e-voting systems reapproval conditions clearly disagree with security measurres Jan Brewer considers "problematic , unnecessary and driven by local political interests". As for the accessible e-voting devices provided for the blind, exactly how are they to be assured, while maintaining secrecy of the ballot, that their ballot choices will be accurately recorded and counted. The TTBR clearly states that touchscreen DRE's with VVPAT's are not an acceptable method for acceptable use without a 100% manual tally audit, which still leaves the potential for malware to corrupt the vote tally. Have you considered the use of templates? As for audits, voters in Cuyahoga County, Ohio will assure you that post election day audits can and have been rigged. Pima County Arizona election integrity activists are not alone in their call for reform. Voters across the nation are waking up to the realization that they do not have democratic elections when they can not personally observe their votes being marked, cast and counted. It is not a surprise that Brewer vehemently defends her procedures. However insider fraud happens every day in every state across the nation. What makes AZ elections immune to this problem? It is certainly absurd to state that the "procedures" go beyond what is necessary to secure an election, when the "procedures" are dependent on human being who are prone to error and malicious intent , to implement them and the machines are subject to security breech. It would be more accurate for Ms. Brewer to state that it is the "proprietary interests", and not the "procedures" alone which are responsible for no reported security breeches in the State of Arizona.
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I have served as a poll worker in Yuba County CA since the 2006 primary. That was the first election that DRE machines with VPAT's (paper trail) were used in the county. Unfortunatly, due to the review you mentioned the county has hundreds of DRE machines that were purchased and now sit unused. The county has returned to using optical scan ballots, which have an increased chance of being marked incorrectly and votes not counted. Is anyone suprised that if you put a bunch of experts from UC Berkeley ALONE in a room with a DRE they will be able to compromise it? That is far from the reality of what goes on during an election. All openings on the DRE are sealed with numbered seals and checked throughout the day by poll workers. Plus, don't you think someone would notice a voter with a screwdriver using it on a DRE? The security is in the process surrounding the vote. Your weakest links are those people working at election sites and at the county. As a poll worker, it is would be much easier for me to destroy paper ballots then mess with a DRE. Paper ballots procude a single copy of each vote. The DRE's we use in Yuba County produce three copies (one paper which is reviewed by the voter and two electronic). If you seperate those copies on election night, you can ensure peoples' votes are counted. Otherwise, something could happen to the single paper copy. I say bring back the DRE's and make sure the process surrounding them (and paper ballots) is as secure as possible!