Princeton Researchers Find Flaws in Electronic Voting Machine

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Sep 14, 2006, By Gina M. Scott

Three computer experts from Princeton University have found major security flaws in a popular electronic voting machine. Through analysis of the machine's hardware and software, the researchers believe that the Diebold AccuVote-TS voting machine, which is slated for use in 375 counties in the November 2006 elections, is vulnerable to criminal attacks.

In a paper published yesterday, Ariel Feldman, J. Alex Halderman and Edward W. Felten explain and demonstrate how easy it is for criminals to introduce malicious software to the machine. In less then one minute, a virus can be introduced which will steal votes, spread from machine to machine through memory cards, and can hide its tracks. The software can even delete itself from the machines at the end of elections.

In a demonstration, the researchers held a mock election between George Washington and the notorious Benedict Arnold. By adding the malicious vote-stealing software, an election which should have ended in a 4-1 win for Washington instead left Arnold ahead 3-2. Both the paper print out and the memory card showed the fraudulent results.

According to the paper, voting machines such as this, called Direct Recording Electronic (DRE), are nothing more then "general-purpose computers running specialized election software," of which computer scientists have been skeptical.

The main findings of the study:

Malicious software running on a single voting machine can steal votes with little if any risk of detection. The malicious software can modify all of the records, audit logs, and counters kept by the voting machine, so that even careful forensic examination of these records will find nothing amiss.
Anyone who has physical access to a voting machine, or to a memory card that will later be inserted into a machine, can install said malicious software using a simple method that takes as little as one minute. In practice, poll workers and others often have unsupervised access to the machines.
AccuVote-TS machines are susceptible to voting-machine viruses -- computer viruses that can spread malicious software automatically and invisibly from machine to machine during normal pre- and post-election activity.
While some of these problems can be eliminated by improving Diebold's software, others cannot be remedied without replacing the machines' hardware. Changes to election procedures would also be required to ensure security.

Comments

By Mark Radke on Sep 15, 2006

Diebold Election Systems Response to the Princeton University AccuVote-TS Analysis The following statement may be attributed to Dave Byrd, President, Diebold Election Systems. September 13, 2006 ? ?Three people from the Center for Information Technology Policy and Department of Computer Science at Princeton University today released a study of a Diebold Election Systems AccuVote-TS unit they received from an undisclosed source. The unit has security software that was two generations old, and to our knowledge, is not used anywhere in the country. Normal security procedures were ignored. Numbered security tape, 18 enclosure screws and numbered security tags were destroyed or missing so that the researchers could get inside the unit. A virus was introduced to a machine that is never attached to a network.? ?By any standard - academic or common sense - the study is unrealistic and inaccurate.? ?The current generation AccuVote-TS software ? software that is used today on AccuVote-TS units in the United States - features the most advanced security features, including Advanced Encryption Standard 128 bit data encryption, Digitally Signed memory card data, Secure Socket Layer (SSL) data encryption for transmitted results, dynamic passwords, and more.? ?These touch screen voting stations are stand-alone units that are never networked together and contain their own individual digitally signed memory cards.? ?In addition to this extensive security, the report all but ignores physical security and election procedures. Every local jurisdiction secures its voting machines - every voting machine, not just electronic machines. Electronic machines are secured with security tape and numbered security seals that would reveal any sign of tampering.? ?Diebold strongly disagrees with the conclusion of the Princeton report. Secure voting equipment, proper procedures and adequate testing assure an accurate voting process that has been confirmed through numerous, stringent accuracy tests and third party security analysis.? ?Every voter in every local jurisdiction that uses the AccuVote-TS should feel secure knowing that their vote will count on Election Day.?

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