As agencies at all levels of government continue to move toward electronic creation and maintenance of virtually all records, one of the most intractable problems facing managers, whose records are subject to open records laws, is how much the agency may recover in costs for disclosing or affirmatively disseminating those records. For most access advocates, the answer is easy. Access laws are solidly based on a presumption that fees for access act as barriers to dissemination and, thus, run counter to the entire philosophy of open records laws.

In almost all cases, agencies should be allowed to charge only the marginal costs of dissemination. This means the direct costs associated with searching for and duplicating the records. In a paper environment, for example, a listing of all companies fined for violating certain workplace safety regulations might run to hundreds of pages, take an hour or two to gather, and take another hour to photocopy. That could run up charges in excess of $100 based on allowable direct costs. But if that same information is on a database, it may take a few minutes to find, and less than a dollar to copy off to a diskette. In other words, using a direct- cost model, electronic information can be much cheaper to the requester.

The paradox, however, is that it can also be much more valuable. And it is here that agencies frequently balk, asking why they should be giving away electronic data that may well be worth far in excess of direct costs. One good answer is that ours is a government of the people, by the people and for the people. Information amassed by government agencies is not the proprietary property of those agencies. It belongs, figuratively, to the people. If the people have already paid for its collection, analysis and maintenance, then why should they be required to pay again for access?

To the extent that individual requesters represent no group greater than their own self-interest, government can recoup the actual costs of giving them the information. But it may not recover the costs associated with creating or maintaining the information that has become subject to disclosure. Those costs have already been factored into the decision to collect and maintain the information in the first place. To go back to the earlier example -- the list of those fined for workplace infractions -- that list is probably not created solely to respond to access requests. Instead, it is kept as a record, or as pieces of information that can be assembled into that record, because the agency has some internal use for the information -- be it regulatory, administrative or purely statistical.

Perhaps the best defense of unfettered access to public records used

for commercial purposes has been given by Canada's Information Commissioner John Grace. He pointed out that companies that take public information, massage it and add value, create jobs in the economy. Those jobs, and the profits of those companies, generate taxes. And that is the trade-off. Information companies that enhance the value of government information and then resell it for a profit are certainly receiving no greater subsidy from government than companies who are able to use federal land at below-market value as a way of enhancing their profit margins.

The relationship between government and information brokers is similar to that between a supplier and a middleman who sees a way of taking part of that supply, enhancing its value and distributing it to a specific audience. From an access point of view, government should always consider universal availability of government information as its first goal. But the information broker may well be able to identify an information market that cannot be met by the government's distribution resources because the information must be massaged or refined to too great an extent.

Harry Hammitt  |  Contributing Writer