Wildfires Report Provides New Firefighter Curriculum

As of late July 2008, wildfires burning since June 21 had scorched 1,500 square miles across California; more than 2,000 fires burned simultaneously during the summer, causing hundreds of evacuations and destroying at least 100 homes.

It was devastating, but nothing new for the state. In the early 1990s, a series of fires - Old Topanga, Kinneloa, Laguna, Paint, Tunnel/Berkeley Hills and Harmony - together caused 30 fatalities and burned 4,907 structures and 52,422 acres.

That series of wildfires a decade ago spawned a report, Command During Catastrophic Interface Wildfires, which was published in 2004 and written by Michael Rohde, a battalion chief and 35-year veteran of the Orange County Fire Authority. The report is an influential set of best practices for how fires should be fought when numerous structures ignite quickly and simultaneously along the interface (i.e., boundary) between urban development and wild lands.

The report is as relevant to firefighting efforts today as it was four years ago when it was released.

Malibu, Calif., Oct. 23, 1996 -- A California Department of Forestry official watches the wildfire as it burns up a hillside.

Recognizing the Interface Wildfire

Seven experts were interviewed independently for the study. Each of them had developed similar practices over time, even though they hadn't recorded them in writing or verbally, Rohde said.

The best practices that each expert applied in his unique locale and environment were published in Command During Catastrophic Interface Wildfires. Topics also include: how to recognize an interface wildfire, survive in that environment and achieve the best results.

There were 47 factors common among the six fires assessed in the study. They included:

• All fires occurred during critical fire weather patterns involving Santa Ana or other "foehn winds" - a down slope wind near a mountain range.
• Native chaparral shrubs, such as manzanita, chamise and ceanothus, were abundant in the fire areas and served as fuel for the flames.
• Multiple major fires occurred simultaneously in the surrounding region.
• Each fire began as a wildfire and transitioned into structures.
• The fires occurred following a wet winter that was preceded by multiple years of drought.

These interface fires exhibit group characteristics, Rohde said. "These fires are different than the normal day-to-day brushfire or interface fire," he said. "They pick up intensity, pace and a style all their own when they're going to go big - that set of characteristics was cataloged in my research; that's when you start to have the worst day of your life. But stand by - 42 more horrible things are going to happen."

Picking up the Pace

During the late-1990s fires, the initial locations of command posts were generally inadequate, according to the report. Command posts burned in three of the six fires that were studied. The inability to provide adequate and timely logistical support, including water and fuel, compromised the firefighting efforts.

"These events happen with speed and agility to the point that they outreach and outpace the ability of the firefighters to combat them and commanders to counter them," Rohde said.

In an everyday brushfire, command begins with Division A on the left and Division Z on the right, with the anticipation of putting a few other divisions in between. Odds are, Rohde said, additional resources will arrive in time to get the job done adequately, even if there's a rapidly evolving fire.

However, during interface wildfires, that strategy won't work.

"There aren't enough chiefs on duty, even regionally, to fill enough division-supervisor jobs to provide for quality, on-the-ground management of the fire, which automatically