The December hostage situation in Australia is another example. It was an attack on a soft target, a target that would not fit the “traditional” profile of being highly visible or connected to government or military operations, carried out by an individual espousing extremist beliefs but acting essentially alone.
Who remembers the pipe bombs placed in mailboxes throughout the American Midwest during spring 2002? A total of 18 bombs were placed with six of those exploding (injuring four U.S. Postal Service mail carriers and two residents) and 12 others discovered without exploding. Until the suspect was apprehended, how many of us changed our routine for something as mundane as getting the mail because, suddenly, that everyday activity had become potentially deadly?
You could say the same thing about the anthrax attacks in fall 2001. Letters containing a very specific strain of B. anthracis were mailed to several U.S. senators as well as to media outlets in New York City and Boca Raton, Fla. Twenty-two people contracted anthrax, five fatally, with another 31 testing positive for exposure and more than 10,000 people categorized as at risk. Again, what had been a routine task we never thought twice about (opening our mail) had suddenly become potentially life-threatening.
This is the new, evolving face of terrorism: nontraditional terrorism. Main Street terrorism.
We’re good at stopping the big stuff, and we’re getting better at that all the time. We’ve worked hard and made significant improvements to physical security and other counterterrorism measures at what have always been considered attractive potential targets: airports, government buildings, sporting venues, etc. But what about the “small” stuff? What about the attacks that strike fear into our hearts and change the minutiae of our daily routines not because of their scope, scale or complexity, but because of their abject brutality and random nature?
There is a lot of news coverage about the possibility of Americans traveling to Iraq and Syria to join with ISIS, and then returning to the U.S. better trained to carry out an attack here on our soil. Is that happening? In all probability yes, but the fact remains that a person doesn’t have to travel halfway across the world, join in an armed conflict and then return here to pose a legitimate threat.
Instead, they decide that their role in jihad is to drive their car at high speed through a school playground at recess time, or to open fire at a crowded city bus stop or at the crowd around an airport baggage pickup carousel (because let’s face it, even though you have to pass through multiple layers of mutual-supportive security to board an aircraft, you don’t have to do much to get to baggage claim). And because the “conspiracy” to commit that type of attack remains in the mind of the attacker, relying on traditional methods and sources of intelligence is going to be of limited value. If an attacker doesn’t engage in social media, or text or email — if none of the “chatter” exists — then our capabilities in data monitoring and collection are nullified.
It’s an ugly subject — the thought that terrorism has become so commonplace that we can categorize it as traditional or nontraditional — but that appears to be more and more the case.
Jim Sharp is the vice president and chief training officer for Aegis Emergency Management.
