In recent years, law enforcement and counterterrorism officials have increasingly focused on the lone offender as a particularly elusive and challenging type of threat, as noted, for example, on the FBI home page on domestic terrorism. Should initial indications that the Aurora perpetrator acted alone be borne out by subsequent investigation, the movie theater tragedy will serve as a vivid reminder that the lone offender can take many forms and wreak great havoc.
The mugshot of James Holmes, who is suspected of killing 12 people and wounding 58 on July 20. Photo courtesy of the Arapahoe County Detention Center.
Let us consider some of the implications of the Aurora tragedy for public safety and place it in the context of some potentially relevant previous events. Given the relative youth and academic affiliation of suspected perpetrator 24-year-old James Holmes (a graduate student in neuroscience reportedly in the process of withdrawing from his studies at the University of Colorado Denver), previous cases of school shootings such as the Virginia Tech and Columbine High School tragedies readily come to mind. It should be noted that this event differs from those and other examples of school/workplace killing sprees in that the location targeted was not on campus or in any obvious way symbolically linked to the perpetrator’s educational or occupational life.
The choice of a movie theater (and one hosting the premiere of the latest Batman film) as the arena for the violent expression of the perpetrator’s aggression is significant in a number of respects. The most obvious is the link to the prominent superhero/supervillain theme running through the attack scenario. The perpetrator chose to equip and clothe himself like a supervillain and enact a “script,” which could have been taken directly from the darkest of graphic novels or film. In a macabre twist, the suspect — who had dyed his hair a shocking red/orange color — reportedly introduced himself to the arresting officers by saying, “I am the Joker.”
More subtly perhaps, a theater (be it a traditional Broadway style venue or a cinematic multiplex) represents a very distinctive form of public space. Theaters are places in which people retreat from their everyday lives in search of relaxation and/or stimulation. In the dark of the theater, people tend to become absorbed in the drama unfolding on screen and let one’s guard down. This is a fact that has not gone unnoticed by perpetrators of political violence. It was probably not a coincidence that John Wilkes Booth (an actor by trade) and his co-conspirators chose the Ford’s Theatre in Washington, D.C., for the site of their deadly plot against President Abraham Lincoln in 1865. Theaters (and opera or concert venues) may also represent buildings of great cultural/architectural significance and/or draw an elite audience providing an attractive target for potential perpetrators of public violence. This was true of the Dubrovka Theater, which was the site of a spectacular hostage siege orchestrated by Chechen separatists in Moscow in October 2002. In such cases, as in Aurora, a far deadlier drama may play out in the VIP boxes or in the orchestra seating than the one portrayed on stage or screen.
It is chilling to note that the Aurora perpetrator appears to have been engaged in an act of “performance violence,” to use a term often associated with terrorism expert Mark Juergensmeyer. The term has traditionally been used to describe particularly dramatic, shocking and symbolically loaded forms of terrorism such as that orchestrated or inspired by al-Qaida. However, the Aurora case suggests that the term may also be usefully extended in order to cover other types of acts of sensational public violence arising from or couched in guises associated with film, literature or other forms of popular and fine art.
In a previous article, I explored some of the lessons of the Oslo attacks perpetrated by Norwegian right-wing extremist Anders Breivik of potential relevance to U.S. homeland security. Breivik also was a practitioner of the vicious art of performance violence: He altered his appearance and costumed himself — as a knight, commando and policeman — for purposes of propaganda and operational deception. While there are significant differences between these cases that occurred just 363 days apart, comparing and contrasting the circumstances of the Aurora tragedy with the Olso attacks of 2011 is instructive.
[Read more about what the U.S. can learn from the two-pronged attack in Norway.]
Breivik conceived his bombing of the Norwegian government buildings and shooting attacks on the political youth meetings on Utoeya Island in highly political terms. His acts of public violence were explicitly intended not only as a means to attack a government apparatus and the next generation of a political party he despised, but also as a vehicle to take his manifesto and political messages/images viral on the Internet. No such political intent has yet come to light in the Colorado case. Though we still know relatively little about how the Aurora attacks were prepared, there are strong indications of highly organized behavior, and the assault on the movie theater was creatively and efficiently conceptualized, planned and executed in several key respects. The perpetrator reportedly legally purchased at least four weapons (an assault rifle, shotgun and two automatic pistols as well as thousands of rounds of ammunition for them). He also was apparently able to acquire smoke bombs, elaborate para-military style protective gear, and the makings of a large number of improvised explosive devices in the months before the attack. This too is reminiscent of Breivik’s devastatingly sequenced attacks, which claimed the lives of nearly 80 people and injured more than 300. Breivik’s operation was the product of careful study, meticulous preparation and elaborate camouflaging of his activities, and were at least several years in the making, as documented in minute detail in the chronicle of his journey to infamy.
There are other parallels worthy of note between the Olso and Aurora attacks. Both the Aurora perpetrator and Breivik used situational camouflage to blend in and throw their victims off guard. In Breivik’s case, a police uniform was used to gain access to the island of Utoeya and manipulate his victims. In Aurora, by choosing a costume, methods and “props” (gas and weapons) consistent with the premiere showing of the onscreen drama, movie-goers and staff were reportedly put off their guard and initially thought that the spectacle on the floor of the theater was part of the show, thus helping the perpetrator to position himself and his equipment while delaying the reactions of the audience, staff and by extension, first responders.
Yet another blood-curdling element of the Aurora event is the reported elaborate booby-trapping of the suspect’s apartment. By arranging for music to be played at a very loud volume, the perpetrator may have intended to draw attention to his apartment and lure neighbors and/or first responders to the site. Whether this was originally intended to be a diversionary attack (a la Breivik) to distract law enforcement and other first responders and enable the strike at the cinema or a supervillain-style secondary strike is difficult to determine at this stage. However, reports that the suspect warned investigators to use caution when entering his apartment because of his placement of improvised explosive devices seem consistent with the diversionary hypothesis. Once the movie theater attack was accomplished (and the suspect in custody), the apartment trap may have seemed gratuitous and counterproductive to the suspect’s purposes.
Though the responders in Aurora (and the suspect’s neighbors and bystanders) escaped injury this time due to a combination of what appears to have been luck, vigilance and the successful clearing of the site with the support of federal explosives experts, Aurora could all too easily have been a double tragedy like the one in Oslo last summer. Though this part of the perpetrator’s elaborate plan fortunately did not claim lives, other would-be supervillains (or terrorists) may well add something inspired by this attack — or other aspects of the Aurora scheme — to their bag of tricks. The U.S. responder community, and its counterparts around the world, will need to be ready.
The growing literature on learning from crises shows that this vital task is difficult, painful and all too often done badly. When it comes to contingencies involving human adversaries or perpetrators, the learning process is also competitive. The homeland security, law enforcement and first responder communities must carefully study and learn from cases like this one and others like it from around the globe. Sadly, it is all too likely that others with ill intentions are looking for inspiration and insights into our vulnerabilities. Crisis preventers and crisis managers must cultivate the ability not only to draw the right lessons, but also to rapidly and effectively translate these lessons into an improved capacity to prevent, respond and recover from community tragedies like the one that struck Aurora.
Eric Stern is a professor at the University of Virginia and Swedish National Defense College.
