Public officials with a specific interest in managing this new risk participated in the Intergovernmental Policy Congress (IPC) held in Washington, D.C., to create a list of specific recommendations. Delegates were from city and county government as representatives of the first-responder community. They reached quick agreement about the importance of the bio-terrorism threat and the fact that most local governments are ill equipped to deal with it.
Bioterrorism adds a new dimension to the nation's vulnerability and puts added pressure on local agencies to perform non-traditional functions. For example, county health agencies have normally been tasked with monitoring the potential spread of infectious diseases and providing public-health services. Their lexicon did not include the insidious effects of deliberately spread anthrax, smallpox, plague and lethal viruses and tens of thousands of potential deaths.
Local governments as first responders find themselves in new territory when it comes to managing the threat of bioterrorism. How governments restructure their organizations to meet the threat will determine the nation's readiness to face what comes.
Funding
According to IPC panelists, governments are facing several challenges in making effective and efficient use of the allocated bio-terrorism funding. Most of the monies are available as one-time grants with no promise of sustained support for projects or investments. This one-shot approach precludes the hiring of personnel, such as the epidemiologist that Yuba County, Calif., considered adding to its health department.
In addition, one delegate noted that stipulations for qualifying for the money keep changing. Local governments have been uncertain about what projects or proposals to submit.
Eric Holdeman, manager of the Office of Emergency Services for King County, Wash., also pointed out the limits of single-discipline funding in which separate agencies, such as police, fire and emergency services, receive separate allocations. This approach can lead to the creation of disparate systems and policies. The result, he warned, is a system that lacks coordination, prevents interoperability and prohibits local governments from tailoring spending to meet the jurisdiction's specific needs.
Delegates suggested a revised approach to funding the bio-terrorism effort: one based on cross-jurisdictional collaboration. The elimination of stovepipe funding and establishment of regional consortia would also maximize the buying power of federal funds. In addition, decisions about how funds will be spent should be made with the input of all stakeholders.
Yuba County formed a committee that included health officials, the CHP, County Sheriff and others. This collaboration resulted in a focus on training county personnel in key areas of planning and response. Interagency planning efforts can maximize the impact and distribute the benefits of limited funds. Joint efforts among jurisdictions can also increase efficiency and effectiveness.
Turf, Trust and Respect
The cultures of agencies suddenly aligned to fight bioterrorism do not foster cooperation, according to IPC delegates. Law enforcement, one of the most important partners, has a long history of secrecy and isolation that hinders the resource information sharing. A delegate in the law enforcement arena admitted that this protectionist attitude comes with the nature of the job.
However, demands of homeland security require law enforcement and partnering agencies develop methods to share critical information and resources. Delegates observed that an agency seldom understands the mandates and structures outside their purview. Consequently, there is distrust, territoriality and even a lack of respect for the expertise that resides in each silo.
Elected officials on the panel pointed out yet another government dynamic at work. Agency staff know that policies (and perhaps personnel) will likely change when a new administration takes the reins. Knowing they will outlast the politicians, agency staff can become very possessive about their turf.
Strategies to overcome these historical divisions include strong leadership, like that demonstrated by Honolulu's Mayor Jeremy Harris who mandated a sweeping bio-terrorism preparedness effort. According to Salvatore Lanzilotti, director of the city's Emergency Services Department, the mayor's directive caused interagency cooperation and, consequently, creation of one of the nation's foremost systems for detecting the presence of biological agents. Lanzilotti observed that bioterrorism precludes the existence of silos because the problem is bigger than any one group.
In addition, including separate agencies in planning efforts and in the creation of joint proposals can create accountability to a mission that crosses conventional boundaries. Moving a step beyond, jurisdictions should be encouraged to build regional collaborations that further address the ubiquitous nature of the bio-terrorism threat.
Interoperability and Integration
The experience of 9-11 in New York City was graphic evidence of the need for interoperable information and communication systems. The threat demands that multiple agencies be able to share information and communicate without interruption in an emergency.
Along with the dismantling of stovepipe cultures in governments, delegates agreed that standards were needed to ensure that systems are compatible. This requires interagency planning and implementation of integrated systems and policies. Delegates also pointed out the importance of private sector partners in this effort. Kent Blossom, director of public-sector safety and security services for IBM, suggested that government could make it easier for business to offer solutions. He urged governments to be aggressive in adopting interoperable solutions that are based on industry standards. Without interoperability, collected information will not be available to first responders in a public-health emergency.
The same concept applies in the arena of training agency personnel to manage and respond to bio-terrorism events. Because bio-agents do not respect borders and boundaries, there should be agreement and shared understanding about the best strategies for handling threats or events. Delegates urged governments to adopt enterprise standards throughout its processes and systems.
Information and Education
Delegates were unanimous in agreeing that information about the threat and methods for handling bioterrorism is inadequate. One county official said that when his city received an anthrax threat, the person receiving the call, unsure about how to proceed, phoned the media instead of alerting local health officials.
In addition, decision-makers are often uninformed and, consequently, reluctant to fund programs that adequately prepare agencies to manage the threat. An elected official from Colorado admitted that she lacked the information necessary to make intelligent decisions about bioterrorism. She urged representatives from agencies involved in prevention and response to communicate with their city councils and county boards.
The targets for bioterrorism will differ among various jurisdictions. Consequently, there is no single solution or strategy for decision makers to follow. Education of elected officials can help to direct funds where they are needed most.
In addition, there is a nationwide need for training of government employees in several arenas, from law enforcement to public utilities and public health, including bioterrorism, which has generally not been a training topic or priority for local governments.
Information about bioterrorism and its agents is available from the Federal Emergency Management Agency and from the Centers for Disease Control. IPC delegates said these agencies are valuable and underutilized.
Cooperative Agreements
Governments at all levels are traditionally stand-alone entities. Before 9-11 there was little cause for coalition building among states, counties or cities. Consequently, many jurisdictions lack written vehicles to build cooperative agreements to respond to the bio-terrorist threat.
And, although technology companies often refer to themselves as "partners" with government, the reality is far different. In the post 9-11 environment, government officials are recognizing the importance of private-sector expertise and support.
Since a bio-terrorist attack would likely involve numerous agencies and potentially more than one jurisdiction, participants urged the development of cooperative agreements. Mutual aid, interstate and intrastate pacts are needed to adequately respond to the threat of bioterrorism. Delegates suggested the concept of "regionalism" should be adopted and used to leverage tools, information and human resources in the effort to prevent or respond to bioterrorism.
But government would not be alone in the event of an attack. Delegates agreed that it is important to include the private sector in the continuum of emergency planning. Holdeman said his county in Washington has agreements with a wireless provider and Lanzilotti said that Honolulu has already enlisted the help of pharmaceutical companies.
People Matter
In summarizing the experience of serving as moderator of the bio-terrorism group, Washington's Holdeman stated his belief that homeland security is largely dependent upon relationships. Although the precepts and tools outlined by panel participants are essential to managing the threat, it is the human element that provides the underpinnings for successful action. "Pick up the phone and start building bridges to the people and organizations you once considered your adversaries," he said. "The solution is not in your office, not in your department, not in more funding. It is in learning to partner."
