The Metropolitan Police Department (MPD) was the primary responding agency, and it completed an internal investigation and detailed after action report. The Washington Post obtained a copy of this under a Freedom of Information Act request, and I was alerted to this by Dave Statter of Statter911 (thanks Dave).
There is very useful information on all aspects of the response, but I will focus on communication and public information.
Communication with other agencies
Ever since incidents such as Cosco Busan highlighted the problems with the LNO function within incident command, I have strongly encouraged response partner communication to be a core element of the PIO and JIC. That’s why I found it interesting that Observation 27, which deals with problems with interagency communication, did not appear in the section on Public Information. Yes, in ICS the liaison officer is charged with keeping all other agencies and response partners informed and coordinated. But the PIO and JIC have (or should have) the advanced tools to do that while the LNO typically does not. Close coordination is needed but the LNO should rely on the JIC to help keep other agencies informed if they have the digital communications tools and ability to do so.
Issues with the JIC
The report details several strengths and weaknesses of the JIC. It was established within 45 minutes of the first 911 call and a half hour after MPD officers entered the building. The JIC including police PIOs and public affairs staff of local elected officials. It was located at 3rd and M streets, which was seen as a strength as it took media away from unified command. However, it had no computers nor monitors for media monitoring. And being physically disconnected from command, there were a number of problems identified with lack of coordination with command and JIC. Quoting the summary of Observation 28 in full:
“The JIC’s lack of access to computers, combined with their lack of direct representation in Unified Command, resulted in the lead officials not receiving vital support from their respective public affairs staffs when preparing for the first few press conference. In turn, the public affairs personnel were not aware of what the officials would be stating at the press conferences. Additionally, without a representative in the JOCC [Command Center], the JIC was unaware of the overall operations and community messaging. With the many PIO personnel on scene, it was difficult to discern who was serving as the lead of the JIC.”
While overall it seems the report was reasonably positive about the public information, this strikes me as near abject failure of the JIC. Note:
- no representative of the JIC helping those who would conduct press conference or advising on public information issues;
- JIC not getting information about the event -- JIC learning about details from command at the same time as the press during the press conference;
- JIC not having access to computers; and
- unclear who was in charge.
Observation 29 points out that the Navy and the hospital where victims were sent were not involved in the JIC. The Navy released information about hospital location of shooting victims, which violated law enforcement protocol designed to protect potential witnesses. Guards had to be sent to the hospital. The report summarizes: “These examples highlight the importance of having a representative from all agencies and involved stakeholders in order to coordinate accurate information sharing to the press and community.”
Observation 30 says that while the JIC and JOCC provided regular info to the media, it lacked coordination. This is stunning to me. The JIC’s role appears to have been to coordinate press conferences with unified command, while the JOCC was providing the digital communications. Two methods are mentioned: MPD’s community listservs (haven’t heard that term used for a while) and tweets. It was even discovered that a police district was sending messages to its own listserv, which was stopped when discovered. The summary talks about lack of coordination of information from JIC to JOCC. What seems to me is completely missing is what the heck was the JOCC doing the JIC’s job for, and why did the JIC (with its apparent lack of leadership) seem to think the only important thing to do was set up press conferences?
There was no mention of a website used to distribute information. I don’t know for certain whether there was one or not, but given they mentioned other means of communicating I’m guessing not. What is more damning to me than the JIC (or JOCC) not using a website is the fact that it wasn’t even noticed by those doing the after action report.
Rampant misinformation
The report highlights the rampant misinformation provided by the media during the event. Observation 31 states: “... in their rush to break the news, some members of the media made serious errors in judgment.”
Reporters were using police scanners to report the news, at one point leading to false identification of a suspect.
Here is where I have to say that those writing the report appear to be operating in a world that has disappeared.
The report states: “On the day of the shooting, law enforcement officials recognized the need to keep the public informed and held five press conferences throughout the day. Each time, law enforcement and city officials provided the media and the public with the latest information that had been learned as the investigation progressed.”
I have a hard time believing they are serious. Do they really think in this day that holding five press conference with the “latest” information will keep the media beast fed? Are they not aware that most people now get news through smartphones and they rely on Twitter and other social media to know what is going on? Have they not heard of NanoNews, where instant information sharing occurs, not just with the professional media using police scanners, but thousands of citizens?
But they are serious as demonstrated by their recommendation for Observation 31: “Law enforcement officials should put the press on notice -- early on and in a public forum -- clearly indicating that all official information regarding the incident will come from Incident or Unified Command or through formal public information channels.”
Apparently the MPD believes the genie can be shoved back in the bottle. Do they think by making this announcement in a public forum that the media are going to sit around and wait for one of the five press conference? That they will not listen and report on what they hear on police scanners or from those inside a building with an active shooting using Twitter? Do they think they will ignore reports from the Navy just because they are not part of the JIC or JOCC?
Yes, the police through a well-run JIC (not JOCC!) should be the best source of the information and the media will learn that early on if they indeed provide fast, accurate and honest information. The JIC should be monitoring the media and social media continually, identifying and quickly correcting rumors and misinformation. And of course, JIC personnel should be in the JOCC gathering the latest information, getting real-time approvals, and advising command on emerging questions and issues. But they cannot stop the misinformation, the early and often false reporting, by fiat. This is either arrogance or ignorance -- neither of which should be adopted as a lesson learned by other agencies.
