Perhaps we are all on a voyage ourselves as individuals. Planning our routes, career paths, cross referencing to know where we are, not over relying on technology, and in times of danger avoiding complacency. I'm not so sure where "squat" fits in, but I'm sure there is something that is analogous to our human endeavors. As noted below, is is the human factor that makes life and disasters so interesting.
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THE COSTA CONCORDIA DISASTER: A Lesson in Performance on The Bridge By Captain Dan S. Parrott, Author of Bridge Resource Management for Small Ships A Study of Ship Disasters, including Queen Elizabeth II & Monarch of the Seas
In the months to come, the events leading to the grounding of the Costa Concordia, and the emergency response, will be turned over carefully by investigators as they attempt to separate fact from rumor in this spectacular catastrophe. Lessons will be learned, but many of them will be familiar. Some of those lessons will undoubtedly be connected to Bridge Resource Management (BRM), an approach to understanding human performance as a way of preventing accidents like this one.
While we wait for the full story to be told, it is apt to consider some of the themes of BRM that could have prevented this accident and which are likely to be discussed going forward:
- VOYAGE PLANNING. Every voyage should be planned in detail from berth to berth, including an appraisal of potential hazards along the chosen route. Planning a route obviously includes identifying hazards to avoid, such as land and shoals. But it also includes identifying areas requiring higher situational awareness by the navigational team, and avoiding environmentally sensitive areas when possible. It is self-evident that the Costa Concordia did not follow a safe route and investigators will look very closely at the planned route and any deviations from it, intentional or not.
- MARGINS OF SAFETY (MOS). In addition to laying courses through safe water, voyage planning involves establishing margins of safety, buffer zones between the intended route and any hazards along it. A margin of safety is a commonsense defense against all kinds of errors. MOS provide reaction time if a vessel should stray from its course, but they also establish an allowance for navigational imprecision (human or equipment based), including possibility of inaccuracies on charts. Clearly, whatever MOS was applied aboard the Costa Concordia it was inadequate.
- SQUAT. Squat is a well known phenomenon whereby vessels operating in shallow waters sink somewhat deeper in the water thereby decreasing under keel clearance, sometimes by several feet. The grounding of Queen Elizabeth II off the coast or Massachusetts in 1992 is believed to have been caused in part by the effects of squat. The amount of squat varies with the hull form and with speed, therefore it is not always possible to anticipate it precisely. However, when planning a route and establishing margins of safety it is standard operating procedure to consider effects of squat, as well as the normal rise and fall of a vessel in a seaway, on under keel clearance.
- OVERRELIANCE. In days gone by when navigation involved considerable guesswork, navigators had to put significant effort into determining their whereabouts, and were often still left in doubt. Such realities were cause for skepticism and caution in navigational matters. Nowadays, easy information obtained at a glance through sophisticated navigational systems can cultivate a sort of blind faith that undercuts traditional vigilance and can lead mariners to accept smaller margins, or no margin, of safety. Time will tell if overreliance on any one navigational system played a role in the Costa Concordia’s demise.
- CROSS-REFERENCING & MONITORING. The main bulwark against overreliance is cross-referencing, and the main job of a watch officer is to monitor the vessel’s progress. The smaller the margins of safety the more important it is to monitor your position by more than one method. The investigation into the 1998 grounding of the Monarch of the Seas in the Caribbean cited the failure to cross reference navigational sources as a factor in that incident. Electronic charts based on GPS data are among the best navigational tools available to mariners, yet they are still subject to both small and large inaccuracies at times. It will be important to learn if the bridge team of the Costa Concordia was cross referencing GPS positions with radar or visual bearings, and if doing so would have shown a significant discrepancy in the ship’s position.
- COMPLACENCY. Failure to place adequate weight on any of the above issues is a sign of complacency, which is among the most normal of human failings in all walks of life, not just on ships. Complacency can arise from ignorance, inexperience or, ironically, from over-familiarity with a situation. Whatever the source, it often leads to a failure to perceive or respect risks that are present. When the complacency of an individual or an organization contributes to an accident such as this one, it is hardly a revelation. If the reports that the captain of the Costa Concordia was showboating, either for people ashore or passengers aboard, are found to be true it could certainly be construed as a failure to perceive the risks and respect the hazards he was trusted to avoid.
About the Author:
Captain Daniel S. Parrott is the author of BRIDGE RESOURCE MANAGEMENT FOR SMALL SHIPS, which offers lessons and principles on the role of shipboard leadership and the human factor in the safe operations of vessels.
