But, it has been interesting to see more of an active duty military presence develop since 9/11 with the establishment of Northern Command and the assignment of Defense Coordinating Officers (CDO) and a detachment with each FEMA Region.
With the above as a preamble, see the guest blog post below by Bill Cumming who has had plenty of seat time in D.C. and at FEMA and is a keen observer of laws, plans and their intended and sometimes unintended consequences.
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From the Desk of Bill Cumming:
SUBJECT FOR FURTHER STUDY:
Whether further militarization of domestic civil crisis management jeopardizes the governmental system and heritage of the United States?
BACKGROUND:
Astoundingly, in the years of the administrations of President Ronald Reagan and George H. W. Bush only active or retired military officers, some of flag rank officer served as National Security Advisors but only one supported strengthening of civil agency capability and plans as opposed to preemptively trying to take over domestic civil response. Name of that General—Colin Powell. Before General Powell two officers one a retired field grade officer Marine Infantry and one a Vice Admiral in the Navy had served Reagan as NSC advisor- “Bud” Robert C.McFarlane and John Poindexter. Colin Powell was followed by General Brent Scowcroft as head of the NSC staff under George H. W. Bush. The NSC staff in the last three decades has been largely staffed by serving military officers on detail from DoD. The exact staffing of the NSC since its establishment in 1947 would be of interest as far as giving insight in military civil relationships. President Obama’s first NSC Advisor was retired Marine 4-star James Jones. I view that staffing pattern as eroding civilian control of the military.
DISCUSSION:
1988 National Security Emergency Plan
Civil Domestic Management and Response--On the Road to All-Hazards Plans and Preparedness
One of the interesting areas for research is the development and background of the National Response Framework [NRF] issued in final January 2008 [now again under active revision]. The NRF also includes a biological incident annex published September 2008. The NRF supersedes the National Response Plan [NRP] that was mandated by the Homeland Security Strategy of 2002, the Homeland Security Act of 2002, the Reorganization Plan submitted on November 25, 2002, and HSPD-5 [February 28, 2003] and was thus a major Goal for DHS to accomplish. With its constant revisions and failure to integrate other strategies and plans it can now be concluded that that Goal was NOT met. Somewhat ironically, or perhaps even with elements of tragedy as experienced by NOLA, just as the Federal Response Plans issuance in May 1992 was soon calibrated by the reality of events of Hurricane Andrew in August 1992, the National Response Plan [widely reported to have been effective December 2004] made effective officially in April 2005 was shortly to be calibrated by the events of Hurricane Katrina. Homeland Security Presidential Directives HSPD 5 and 8 [issued fall 2003] reinforced the GOAL but again did not achieve the Goal of implementing these mandates. Implementation would of course have had to include extensive training and exercising in order for the NRP to achieve its purposes. FEMA has now contracted out a project to develop its “doctrines” with respect to its disaster operations. That efforts deliverables are due shortly. That effort is dominated by retired military officers. No known participation of STATE and LOCAL officials is part of the process.
In reality the foundation for an all-hazard civil response plan with military support had been in evolution since the administration of President Ronald Reagan. One key element of the evolution of the all-hazards planning concept had been FEMA’s National Security staff insisting on providing a separate National Security Emergency Plan throughout the early Reagan Administration. This backgrounder explains why that effort was eventually directed to incorporating into the Federal Response Plan issued in May 1992 all civil response elements for National Security Emergencies. The 1992 FRP contains a single paragraph concerning its application to National Security Emergencies. That term first appeared in EO 12472 and was defined in EO 12656 both of which are still extant. As always given the size of DOD resources the challenge to the civil agencies has been to effectively incorporate DOD support for civil agency programs, functions, and activities and not be overwhelmed or preempted by DOD at the same time.
The concept of a National Security Emergency Plan for large scale domestic catastrophic incidents/events was developed by National Security Council staff as early as 1983 and was derivative of early planning efforts mandated by the Federal Civil Defense Act of 1950, Public Law 920 of the 81st Congress (hereinafter the “ FCDA”). That statute, which somewhat crudely tried to reconcile defense of the population from active warfare, both nuclear and conventional, mandated not only plans but a civil defense system that was to be implemented by those plans. Because the so-called Plan D and Plan Other than D was the end product, one to deal with nuclear warfare conducted at a strategic level and one to deal with conventional warfare, both classified and seldom shared with the State and Local governments, it was seen that some largely unclassified effort was needed to leverage state and local assets. President Eisenhower, when the Deputy Army Chief of Staff for Plans and in charge of war planning, had been attributed with saying “Planning is everything but the plan is nothing.” A relatively recent comprehensive discussion of civil emergency planning appears in “Facing the Unexpected-Disaster Preparedness and Response in the United States,” Kathleen J. Tierney, Michael L. Lindell, and Ronald W. Perry, Joseph Henry Press, Washington, D.C. (2001). It is certain that planning, and the coordination, collaboration, and cooperation needed to produce any plan has been identified as a key element of preparedness. It is significant that planning alone is not equivalent to preparedness, which also includes the verification of capability of the elements of logistics, personnel, equipment, training and exercises.
