There are a number of very important points made by Thomas Richardson of the Seattle Fire Department and head of Task Force 1 Urban Search and Rescue. He was called in, not to help with rescue as it was too late for that, but to help with recovery. Which of course, leads to one question: Why the delay? But I don't have the inside scoop other than what I have heard from others that the initial response was not textbook by any means.
The general attitude I have picked up from many in response management, particularly oil spill response, is that volunteers are a pain in the, well, response. They are more trouble than they are worth. They don't have the training; they're not reliable; they demand too much, and are not worth it. A typical decision is to put up the tape and keep them away. At best, direct them to some nonprofit organization supporting the event such as a bird cleaning operation or the Red Cross, but keep them away from the main response activity.
This is simply not realistic, necessary or wise in many responses. Certainly it is in some when the safety officer determines (reasonably) that the risk outweighs the help. That's why I was surprised and pleased to see the remarks by Mr. Richardson about volunteers:
We were actually not supposed to release that information [talking about location of bodies], but in the end you’re either a responder or you’re not, so we treated all responders the same. Just because you’re a civilian doesn’t mean you don’t have the capability of dealing with exposure to traumatic events. Responders are just people who happen to have a job, and yes, we have some training but we’re really not any more equipped to deal with that stuff than Joe Civilian. We’ve dealt with it before, but we need to realize that if people are stepping up to the plate and they understand the difficulties of the mission, we have to just trust that they can be a part of it.
Richardson then points out some very important elements that the volunteers brought to the effort including equipment and supplies in addition to the hard work of finding the bodies. He makes this key point, sure to be uncomfortable to many:
But right now we kind of exclude them and frequently, not in this case, but the government response is promising to take care of everything without the capabilities.
He points out some key failings in the incident action plan. While not specifically stating it, it seems clear that one of the key failings was not considering volunteer resources as part of the response. (Add to that, though not discussed by Richardson, the refusal of command to allow drones that could have aided immensely in both rescue and recovery.)
Chief Bill Boyd's blog It's Not My Emergency has been referred to many times here for insight about the role of the public in responses. This is absolutely true of citizen use of social media, which has been discussed extensively there and here. But it is also true of feet on the ground. The volunteers came because it was their town, their community, their friends and families buried deep in the mud. For emergency managers to show up and say, "Go away, it's not your emergency," would have been bad for the response and much worse for the responder's reputation.
Richardson points out that better communication with volunteers is essential. Here's where the PIO, JIC and crisis communications team come in. Is it their job to communicate with volunteers or the job of the operational response team? That is a crucial question and one that should be worked out in advance. The key is Richardson's comment about whether the volunteers were considered "responders" or outsiders:
Mostly we ended up the recipient of volunteers and were told to use them, but they didn’t really report to us. We need to do a better job of putting them officially in our briefings and including them in our overall plans so they understand.
If they are considered outside the response, not incorporated into it, then clearly it is the role of the PIO and team to include them in response information. They are "public." If, as Richardson suggests, they become incorporated into the response, then they should be briefed and included in planning and communication becomes part of the operational response.
Even if that occurs, as it seems to me it clearly should, prior to them being engaged and brought in, the JIC and communications team will have to deal with the often difficult challenges of coordinating with them. Messages directed at volunteers should be prepared in advance, policies about how to manage them need to be included in plans, and a volunteer coordinating function should be part of the response structure.
One thing seems certain, whether you agree or not with it being "your" emergency or theirs: They are not going away and that means it makes sense to plan for them.
